Module

A VETO SIMULATOR

Try your hand at using the veto power to influence legislation. Here you will play the president. Your goal is to use the veto to shape minimum wage policy. Each of the simulated members of Congress is also attempting to get their most preferred minimum wage policy. To keep matters simple, there will be only one chamber of Congress, and only 7 members in that chamber. You will play through several rounds of the game. Each round will begin when is the status quo is set. The status quo is the initial minimum wage policy. In different rounds, we will pretend that the initial minimum wage policy takes on various values.

After the initial status quo is set, you as president may choose to issue a veto threat.
After you decide whether to issue a veto threat, the Congress will select a bill and pass it.
As president you will then have to decide whether to veto the bill or not.
If you sign the bill, it will become law.
If you veto the bill, the Congress may attempt to override your veto.

The preferences of the legislators are as follows in terms of their most preferred minimum wage. As president, you also have a position on the minimum wage. I've assigned you a preference for a relatively high minimum wage compared to most members of Congress -- $9.50.

How are points scored? As in the simulation in Module 10, each legislator (and now the president too) earns points based upon how colse a policy is to his or her ideal point. The table below gives you a sense of these preferences in terms of points scored. As President, you receive the most points if you canget the minimum wage to reflect your ideal policy of $9.50. You receive fewer points if the minimum wage is either lower or higher than this level.

Some general advice.

Dylan is the median voter, and Emery and Cameron are the potential veto pivots. If the legislature does not believe you will veto, it will always pass a bill setting the minimum wage at Dylan’s preference -- $8.50. If you threaten a veto, legislators will believe it to be credible, and they may attempt to pass a compromise that ensures that they have enough support for the bill that they can override your veto. This might lead to a bill you like better, or to a bill you like worse. If the compromise is one aimed at winning Emery’s vote, then it will probably lead to a bill you like better. But if the compromise is one aimed at winning Cameron’s vote, it might lead to a bill you like worse!

INSERT MINIMUM WAGE VETO BARGAINING GAME HERE

Explore the five minimum wage bargaining scenarios above (minimum wage status quo values at $7.50, $8.50, $9.00 $9.50 and $10.00.). Then answer the questions below.

In which scenario(s) was the president able to use the veto power to prevent any change in the status quo minimum wage?
a. Model answer: In the scenario with a status quo of $9.00 the President can always use the veto to prevent changes in the status quo because the status quo is at the preference of the veto pivot. In the scenario with the status quo at $9.50 the president can sometimes use the veto in this way, but only if the president does not issue a veto threat and thereby takes members by surprise. As the legislators are working on a compromise deal in this context, it is possible that this victory will not endure.
In which scenario(s) did the threat of a presidential veto lead to a compromise policy passing Congress that was different than the preference of the median voter?
a. Model answer: In the scenarios with the status quo at $7.50 and $9.50 the median legislator reached a compromise with one or another of the veto pivots in order to build a majority large enough to overcome a threatened veto.
In which scenario(s) was the veto threat irrelevant?
a. Model Answer: In the scenario with a status quo of $10, the veto threat was ignored by Congress. enough legislators supported decreasing the minimum wage that the legislation at $8.50 had a veto-proof supermajority. Another scenario in which the veto threat was irrelevant was the scenario with a status quo of $8.50 – the preference of the legislative median. Here Congress had no interest in changing policy, and so it mattered not at all whether the president issued a veto threat.

ASSIGNMENTS QUIZ GO TO PAGE 4